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ARTICLE

Antitrust Policy and Horizontal
Collusion in the 21st Century
by William E. Kovacic,
Professor,George Mason University School ofLaw
Introduction
For most of this century, at least since the enshrinement of the per se rule against horizontal
price fixing in United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Co.,' detecting and punishing concerted horizontal price and output restraints have formed the
core of antitrust enforcement in the United States.
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") aggressively
prosecute bid-rigging, price-fixing, and market
allocation schemes.2 In fact, commentators generally regard the enforcement of stringent rules
against such agreements as antitrust's most important positive contribution to the American
3

economy.

Three troubling phenomena attend current efforts to attack collusion and will beset future enforcement programs. One is substantial conceptual uncertainty and doctrinal confusion about
how to distinguish between lawful unilateral conduct and illegal collective behavior. The definition and proof of concerted action are much litigated issues in horizontal restraints cases under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 4 yet neither courts
nor commentators have developed a satisfactory
calculus for determining whether, without direct
proof of agreement, the plaintiff has established
that the defendants conspired to restrain trade.5
A second disturbing phenomenon is the apparent persistence of a significant level of covert collaboration by rivals to set prices or other
vital terms of trade. For some time, business
managers have known that horizontal price-fixing is illegal and punishable by severe civil and
1997

criminal sanctions.6 The per se rule againsthorizontal output restraints is clear, well-known, and
stringently applied to violators, yet the DOJ still
convenes numerous grand juries to probe pricefixing. Reports about the DOJ's criminal inquiry
into price-fixing in the food additives industry which yielded the payment by Archer Daniels
Midland of a record fine of $100 million7 - lead
one to ask how many episodes of collusion go
undetected?
The third phenomenon is the recognition and
use of techniques for coordinating business conduct that courts are unlikely to label as "price
fixing" or even characterize as concerted action.
The modem economic literature has identified
how firms can coordinate conduct by means that
avoid an express exchange of assurances or employ tactics - such as subtle forms of signalling
- that are less likely to attract an antitrust challenge. 8 Enforcement of the Sherman Act has inspired firms to adopt tactics that achieve roughly
the same results as a conventional agreement with
their rivals while operating outside Section 1's
ban on concerted action.
This Article offers a strategy for addressing
these phenomena and guiding antitrust's future
treatment of horizontal collusion. The strategy
has four elements. The first is to reformulate the
doctrine governing the proof of agreement where
the plaintiff lacks direct testimony or documents
proving concerted action and, instead, relies entirely on circumstantial evidence that the defendants conspired to fix prices or restrict output.
FeatureArticle *97

Such an approach would rest heavily on modem coordination of pricing and output decisions
economic understandings of what cartel partici- without significant offsetting of competitive benpants must do to coordinate their behavior.
efits. The FTC could perform this function by
The second element seeks to generate a larger conducting hearings or economic studies. Such
volume of direct evidence of conspiracy. This inquiries might suggest the appropriateness of
Article proposes the use of bounties to encour- proscribing specific conduct by issuing enforceage employees of cartel participants to inform ment guidelines, initiating cases, or adopting
government enforcement officials about episodes administrative rules.
of collusion. A bountyhunting mechanism would
Doctrine governing the use of circumhelp identify covert agreements and, by increas- I.
stantial evidence to prove an illegal
ing the likelihood of detection, would discourSection 1 agreement
age direct exchanges of assurances. This mechanism would also force cartel members to rely
Antitrust litigants demore upon less direct
vote much effort to demeans for coordination
A bountyhunting
termining whether the
which may be harder to
conduct in question
use successfully.
mechanism would help
stemmed from an
The third element is
identify
covert
agreement and, thereto frustrate the formafore, implicates Section
tion and operation of
agreements
and,
by
l's ban against colleccartels by altering govtive
trade restraints. A
ernment policies that faincreasing the likelihood
law whose reach hinges
cilitate effective colluof detection, would
sion. Moreover, an adon the existence of an
agreement requires
justment to the prodiscourage direct
courts to decide what
cesses by which public
entities purchase goods
exchanges of assurances. conduct constitutes an
agreement and how
and services is strongly
9
recommended. With striking frequency, govern- such an agreement may be proven in a trial.
ment purchasing bodies are the victims of colluA.
Four forms of coordination
sive schemes to rig bids. This Article further
advocates the abandonment of procurement practices that make the government more vulnerable
Antitrust disputes under Section 1 of the
to successful collusion by helping cartel mem- Sherman Act present four types of coordination.
bers achieve consensus, detect cheating, and pun- In the first group of matters, the defendants exish defectors.
pressly exchange assurances that they will folThe fourth element is institutional. The Ar- low a common course of action, and the fact of
ticle suggests that the FTC play a greater role in collective action emerges through documents or
identifying conduct that indirectly facilitates the testimony from participants to the challenged
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arrangement. When detected by government
enforcement officials, episodes of such behavior rarely result in fully litigated trials. Instead,
they usually are concluded through plea agreements, civil consent orders, or damage settlements.' 0
Many cases present harder analytical and evidentiary issues. In a second group of matters,
defendants covertly exchange express assurances, but there is no direct evidence showing
that the defendants assured one another that they
would act in concert. Here, the plaintiff relies
on circumstantial proof to demonstrate the probability that the observed behavior resulted from
a covert exchange of assurances.
In a third group of cases, the parties use indirect means to design and adopt a collective plan
of action. Finding an agreement depends on the
plaintiff's ability to specify the tactics that serve
as surrogates for a direct exchange of assurances
and to show that such tactics enabled the defendants to formulate and execute a common strategy.
In a fourth set of matters, firms coordinate their
behavior simply by observing and anticipating
the moves of their rivals. In some industry settings, such conduct may yield competitive effects
that mimic those of an express cartel agreement.
As the hazards of using an express exchange of
assurances to coordinate behavior with rivals
have increased, firms may rely more upon signalling and other tactics that are less likely to
elicit a government inquiry (or, more remotely,
criminal prosecution) and may help achieve some
of the same results.
Horizontal restraints cases have featured continuing efforts to create a vocabulary that describes the continuum of evidence that plaintiffs
have offered to establish concerted action. At
1997

one end of the continuum is proof of direct evidence of an exchange of assurances, often consisting of documents or testimony recounting
how the participant formed a plan of action. At
the other end is unadorned proof of patterns of
parallel behavior - proof that the industry defendants have pursued (simultaneously or sequentially) similar business strategies overtime."
Courts often distinguish between express and
tacit agreements. These terms acknowledge differences in the types of proof used to prove concerted action. Cases speaking of express agreements usually involve direct proof that the defendants exchanged assurances that they will act
in concert - such as a document embodying a
collective commitment to pursue a course of conduct or testimony by which a conspirator describes how the group reached consensus. Direct documentary or testimonial evidence typically stands atop the hierarchy of proof because
it gives the court greater confidence that the defendants acted in concert.
In cases that speak of tacit collusion, the plaintiff usually uses circumstantial evidence to prove
an agreement. The tacit collusion label acknowledges that the proof is inferior to direct documentary or testimonial evidence of an agreement.
Many cases that use this terminology find liability. The crucial policy issue in such matters is
how to define the quantum of proof that will support an inference that the defendants exchanged
assurances.
In some cases, courts seem to use the terms
express and tacit as synonyms for collective and
unilateral. In saying that behavior constitutes a
tacit conspiracy, a court may be saying that,
though the conduct is suspicious, the plaintiff has
not introduced enough proof to permit an inference of collective action. Courts using the terFeatureArticle * 99

minology in this way ordinarily decline to find
liability.
B.

Basic framework of Sherman
Act agreement jurisprudence

Modem judicial efforts to define the elements
of a Section 1 agreement originated in four Supreme Court decisions beginning withInterstate
Circuit,Inc. v. United States 2 in 1939 and ending with Theatre Enterprises,Inc. v. Paramount
3 in 1954. In sustaining
Film DistributingCorp."
the conviction of movie exhibitors for fixing the
prices to be charged for first-run films, the Interstate CircuitCourt defined the concerted action
requirement in these terms:
While the District Court's finding of an
agreement of the distributors among themselves is supported by the evidence, we
think that in the circumstances of this case
such agreement for the imposition of the
restrictions upon subsequent-run exhibitors
was not a prerequisite to an unlawful conspiracy. It was enough that, knowing that
concerted action was contemplated or invited, the distributors gave their adherence
4
to the scheme and participated in it.'
The Court explained that "[a]cceptance by
competitors, without previous agreement, of an
invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary
consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint
of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish
an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman
15
Act."
Seven years later, in American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 6 the Court addressed the agreement issue in reviewing conspiracy to monopo100 • Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

lize charges under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The Court stated that "[n]o formal agreement is
17
necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy."'
The Court explained that a finding of conspiracy
is justified "[w]here the circumstances are such
as to warrant a jury in finding that the conspirators had a unity of purpose or a common design
and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an
unlawful arrangement." 8
In 1948 in United States v. ParamountPictures, Inc., 9 the Court reiterated Interstate
Circuit'sagreement formula. In considering Section 1 and Section 2 conspiracy claims, the Court
said "[i]t is not necessary to find an express agreement in order to find a conspiracy. It is enough
that a concert of action is contemplated and that
20
the defendants conformed to the arrangement."
The formative period of agreement decisions
ended in 1954 in TheatreEnterprises.There the
Court said "[c]ircumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy
inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but 'conscious parallelism' has
not read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act en'2
tirely. '
As a group, the four cases established three
conceptual points of reference. First, courts
would characterize as concerted action interfirm
coordination realized by means other than a direct exchange of assurances. Second, courts
would allow agreements to be inferred by circumstantial proof suggesting that the challenged
conduct more likely than not resulted from concerted action. Third, courts would not find an
agreement where the plaintiff showed only that
the defendants recognized their interdependence
and simply mimicked their rivals' pricing moves.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
tried to capture these principles in a new formula.
Volume 9, number 2

In 1984, in addressing resale price maintenance
conspiracy allegations inMonsanto Co. v. SprayRite Service Corp,' the Court observed:
The correct standard is that there must be
evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action by the [parties].
That is, there must be direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove
that [the parties] had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to
achieve an unlawful objective.13
Neither the Monsanto standard nor its predecessor formulas provides a useful basis for identifying concerted action. These tests show that
the concept of agreement encompasses more than
a direct exchange of assurances, yet they offer
no operational means for determining when the
defendants have engaged in something more than
consciously parallel conduct.
Under the Monsanto formula, one could deem
interdependent conscious parallelism as a "conscious commitment to a common scheme." Each
firm in a tight oligopoly knows that the effect of
its acts depends on the reactions of its rivals. All
producers perceive that price increases will stick
only if all firms raise prices. Realizing their interdependence, each firm decides, without consulting its rivals, to match competitor price increases. Repeated efforts to match rivals' price
moves arguably indicate the firm's conscious
commitment to achieve higher prices. The sole
interfirm communication consists of each firm's
observation of its rivals' price changes. By calibrating its own moves to conform with the decisions of its rivals, each firm can be said to have
"consciously committed" itself to participate in
a "common scheme."
1997

C.

Plaintiff's burden of proof

Plaintiffs in Section 1 cases bear the burden
of establishing the fact of an agreement. The
"conscious commitment to a common scheme"
can be shown with direct or circumstantial evidence.24 As elaborated in later decisions,
Monsanto's articulation of the burden of proof
has considerable importance where the defendant
moves for summary judgment on conspiracy issues.
The fear that mistaken inferences from ambiguous evidence might deter procompetitive or
benign conduct led the Supreme Court in
Matsushita ElectricalIndustrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp.2 to extend and apply Monsanto's
conspiracy standards to horizontal agreements.
Where the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to establish concerted action, Matsushita
stated that "antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in
a Section 1 case" and emphasized that "conduct
as consistent with permissible competition as
with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone,
'
support an inference of antitrust conspiracy."26
Quoting Monsanto, theMatsushitaCourt then
specified the plaintiff's burden of proof when the
defendant seeks summary judgment or a directed
verdict against claims when circumstantial evidence alone is introduced to establish collective
action:
To survive a motion for summary judgment
or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking
damages for a violation of Section 1 must
present evidence that 'tends to exclude the
possibility' that the alleged conspirators
acted independently ....
[Plaintiffs] in this
case, in other words, must show that the
FeatureArticle 9 101

tra ingredient of centralized orchestration of
policy which will carry parallel action over the
line into the forbidden zone of implied contract
and combination. '32 Courts enjoy broad discretion to establish the reach of Section 1 by definAs in Monsanto, the Court in Matsushita ing this "extra ingredient" broadly or narrowly.
Courts have relied on operational criteria
sought to reduce error costs associated with excessively broad application of liability stan- known as "plus factors" to determine whether a
dards.' In Matsushita, Japanese suppliers of pattern of parallel conduct results from an agreeelectronics equipment allegedly conspired to ment. The chief "plus factors" have included:
price below cost in the United States, drive
" The existence of a rational motive for
American firms from the market, and later raise
defendants to act in concert.
prices to monopoly levels. In such a case, the
"
Actions contrary to each defendant's
Court emphasized that mistaken inferences of
self-interest unless pursued as part of
conspiracy could injure consumers by deterring
29
a collective plan.
firms from offering low prices.
Phenomena that can be explained raD.
Interdependence and the role of
tionally only as the result of concerted
plus factors
action, such as submitting uniform
sealed bids where the uniformity could
not result from common cost factors.
In markets characterized by interdependence,
" The defendant's participation in past
each firm realizes that the effect of its actions
3
collusion-related offenses.
depends upon the response of its rivals. " In
" Evidence that the defendants had the
highly concentrated markets, the recognition of
opportunity to communicate or actuinterdependence can lead firms to coordinate
ally did so.
their conduct simply by observing and reacting
"
The
use of facilitating devices such as
to their competitors' moves. In some instances,
delivered
pricing or most favored nayields
parallel
oligopolistic
coordination
such
tion clauses.
behavior (e.g., parallel price movements) that
"
Industry characteristics (product hoapproaches the results that one might associate
mogeneity, frequent transactions,
with a traditional agreement to set prices, output
readily observed price adjustments,
levels, or other conditions of trade.
high entry barriers, and high concenThe line that distinguishes tacit agreements
tration) that are conducive to success(which are subject to Section 1 scrutiny) from
ful coordination.
mere tacit coordination stemming from
" Industry performance data, such as exoligopolistic interdependence (which eludes Sectraordinary profits, that suggest suction l's reach) is indistinct. The size of the safe
3
cessful coordination.
harbor recognized by Theatre Enterprises' deThe absence of a plausible, legitimate
pends on what conduct courts regard as the "exinference of conspiracy is reasonable in light
of the competing inferences of independent
action or collusive action that could not have
harmed [plaintiffs]. 27
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business rationale for suspicious conduct (such as certain communications
with rivals), or the presentation of contrived rationales for certain conduct.
Two basic problems have attended judicial
efforts to identify and evaluate plus factors. First,
courts have failed to establish an analytical
framework that explains why specific plus factors have stronger or weaker evidentiary value
or presents a hierarchy of such factors. Antitrust
agreement decisions rarely rank plus factors according to their probative merit or specify the
minimum critical mass of plus factors that must
be established to sustain an inference that conduct resulted from concerted acts rather than from
conscious parallelism. Nor do courts devote
much effort to evaluating the economic significance of each factor. The lack of a meaningful
analytical framework makes judgments about the
resolution of future cases problematic and gives
an impressionistic quality to judicial decision
making in agreement-related disputes.
The failure in modem cases to provide a hierarchy of plus factors and explain the competitive significance of each might be attributed to
one of the less discussed but more important Supreme Court decisions of the 1960s. In Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp.,33 the Court stated that "plaintiffs should
be given the full benefit of their proof without
tightly compartmentalizing the various factual
components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of each. ' 34 For lower court judges, this passage can be read to dispense with the need for a
careful assessment of the importance of each element of proof and to encourage the practice of
dropping difficult conceptual issues into the lap
of the jury.
1997

The variation in judicial analysis of plus factors suggests that the outcome in many agreement cases depends upon the court's
unarticulated intuition about the likely cause of
observed parallel behavior. Judges appear to vary
in their acceptance of the proposition in Theatre
Enterprisesthat conscious parallelism does not
always bespeak concerted behavior. Judges who
regard pricing uniformity as a sign of collaboration will give lip service to Theatre Enterprises
but will expand the range and reduce the quantum of conduct that, when added to parallel behavior, can support a finding of agreement. On
the other hand, judges who see parallelism as a
desirable, natural manifestation of rivalry are
likely to display a greater reluctance to give effect to asserted plus factors and will be more
sympathetic to the defendants' explanations
about why such plus factors implicate conduct
that is either procompetitive or essentially benign.
The second problem results from the development of new arguments, rooted in the modem
economics literature dealing with repeated
games, that market performance associated with
collusive schemes can result from interdependent, consciously parallel conduct in some industry settings. Firms in a number of industry
settings may be able to achieve collusive outcomes without resorting to conduct that might
be characterized as an agreement. 35 Under
Matsushita,defendants might argue successfully
that observed parallelism is as consistent with
what agreement doctrine has recognized as independent action - namely, the recognition and
response to interdependence - as with an inference of collusive behavior. Moreover, under
Matsushita'simplausibility test, firms could assert that it makes no economic sense for them to

FeatureArticle e 103

IIIII
I

I

use tactics that violate Section 1 of the Sherman
Act when the recognition of interdependence can
yield the same market results. Where the recognition of interdependence alone accounts for the
market outcome, the difficulties in identifying
and prescribing avoidable conduct are likely to
preclude effective antitrust intervention.
E.
Proposed approach for establishing an agreement based on circumstantial evidence
The refinement of federal merger enforcement
policy in the past fifteen years has placed increasing reliance on economic theories that illuminate
the conditions in which consolidation is likely
to have net anticompetitive effects. Among other
features, the DOJ/FIC 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines36 specify how a transaction might increase the abilities of firms to coordinate their
activity. The economic understanding of the process by which firms cooperate successfully
guides the analysis of coordinated
anticompetitive effects.
A similar, economically-oriented reformulation of agreement jurisprudence in circumstantial evidence cases would focus on the three prerequisites to successful cooperation by rivals:
"
*
"

The reaching of a consensus on pricing, output, or other terms of trade;
The detection of deviations from the
agreement; and
The punishment of firms that cheat.

introducing proof that demonstrates how the defendants achieve consensus, detect defection
from the agreed course of action, and sanction
cheaters. To survive a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff would
need to provide a plausible explanation for how
defendants have executed all three tasks. The
defendants could rebut this prima facie case by
advancing benign or procompetitive rationales
for specific challenged acts, or by demonstrating that the observed market outcomes more
likely than not resulted from the recognition of
interdependence alone.
The most important threshold element of proof
in this framework would consist of evidence
showing how the defendants communicate their
intentions and confirm their commitment to a
proposed course of action. Perhaps the most probative proof of the mechanism for achieving consensus would consist of evidence demonstrating
that a pattern of extensive communication among
the defendants preceded a complex, parallel
adjustment in behavior that could not readily be
explained as the product of the defendants independent efforts to identify and adhere to focal
points for organizing their conduct. The existence of a means for detecting cheating might be
revealed by establishing a pattern of bilateral
exchanges of pricing information among competitors or exchanges of data through trade associations. Such conduct might serve the purpose
of identifying defections from the consensus
price.

II.
Bountyhunting as a means for generating direct evidence of conspiracy
A reformulated standard in circumstantial evidence cases would be organized to focus on the
fulfillment of these conditions. Where the eviOver the past twenty years, federal enforcedence of collaboration is wholly circumstantial, ment officials have pursued a number of initiathe plaintiff's prima facie case would consist of tives to increase their ability to obtain direct evi104 9 Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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dence of collusion. The DOJ has resorted more perceive to be unethical conduct). Beyond these
frequently to investigation techniques such as information-gathering techniques, the antitrust
wire-tapping and electronic surveillance and has system does not enlist the assistance of informbroadened cooperation with other law enforce- ers. For example, antitrust doctrine generally
ment entities and government bureaus. The DOJ denies standing to employees who allege that
also has experimented with expanded leniency their employers have engaged in conduct that
and immunity programs that provide incentives restricts competition in product markets in which
for cartel participants to inform the government the employers sell their goods or services. 37
One approach to uncovering and deterring
about episodes of collusion. Collectively, these
steps have increased the likelihood that efforts covert coordination schemes is to give company
by competitors to coordinate their behavior insiders more robust incentives to provide information to enforcement
through a direct exU
agencies. Experimentachange of assurances Over the pasi twenty
a
with
tion
would be detected, prosyears, federal enforcement bountyhunting mechaecuted, and penalized.
nism modeled loosely
Many of these inforon the Civil False
mation-gathering officials have pursued a
Claims Act would serve
mechanisms seek to ob- number of in itiatives to
tain the assistance of
this purpose. 38 Alcartel insiders. Coop- increase their ability to
though the Civil False
Claims
Act
eration by insiders (eidence of
scheme
bountyhunting
such as the disgruntled obtain direct
has a number of serious
employee, or the cartel collusion.
flaws, it properly recogparticipant who feels betrayed by other cartel members - is a key in- nizes the power of decentralized monitoring to
gredient to many successful efforts to unmask uncover violations of the law that otherwise
covert coordination among rivals. Efforts to en- would pass undetected or would be detected withtice insiders to provide information on the cartel out the assistance of insiders only at a compararecognizes the benefits of decentralized moni- tively higher cost.
An antitrust bounty-hunting mechanism would
toring in enforcing antitrust commands. Decentralized monitoring schemes seek to exploit the pay informers a percentage of amounts ultimately
superior access of insiders, vis-a-vis external ob- recovered by the government where the
servers such as government investigators, to in- informer's cooperation contributes significantly
formation bearing upon the commission of vio- to the identification and successful prosecution
of a collusion offense. Such a bounty scheme
lations of the law.
To date, antitrust enforcement has enlisted in- would have the following procedural elements:
formers chiefly by offering leniency or immu" The informer's data would be prenity to offenders, or simply by relying on volunsented in writing to the DOJ.
tary disclosures by nonculpable individuals (such
"
The amount of the informer's bounty
as sales managers who are upset by what they
1997
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ranging up to as much as 25 percent of all recovered fines and civil
penalties - would be set ex post in a
court hearing and would be adjusted
downward where the informer has
helped organize or execute the scheme.
Informers would be protected by antiretaliation safeguards.
Informers could be represented by
counsel, who would be entitled to the
payment of reasonable attorneys fees
and costs for assisting the informer.
Defendant organizations could pursue
counterclaims for contribution against
informers for their participation in illegal collusion.
-

Experimentation with such a mechanism
might run for ten years and would sunset unless
reauthorized by Congress. A ten-year trial would
provide a suitable time to assess the efficacy of
the informing system in eliciting useful information about covert cartels. Its anticipated benefit would be to generate a larger body of direct
evidence of unlawful cooperation and, thus, to
avoid reliance on more problematic circumstantial proof.
HI.

Promoting entry and otherwise destabilizing coordination: the case of public procurement policy

Bid-rigging schemes in federal, state, and local procurement programs account for a strikingly large percentage of DOJ antitrust grand jury
proceedings. From 1988 through 1992, for example, approximately 40 percent of all DOJ
criminal indictments challenged collusive
schemes targeted at public procurement bodies.3 9
Public purchasing authorities seem unusually
106 - Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

vulnerable to successful collusion. In an impressive number of instances, the challenged cartels
have lasted ten years or more.
One important element of anti-collusion policy
is to avoid creating conditions that facilitate successful coordination. To a large degree, government procurement policy assists firms in devising and implementing cartels. Two features of
procurement policy stand out. The first consists
of domestic content or local content purchasing
requirements that narrow the field of potential
bidders. Domestic preference commands such
as the Buy American Act' stymie the destabilizing influence of entry as a discipline on cartel
coordination.
The second feature is a series of procedural
controls that are designed to increase the integrity of the procurement process but whose main
effect is often likely to be the promotion of effective seller coordination. A major example is
the process for opening bids in a sealed bid procurement. Bids ordinarily are unsealed in a public setting and are displayed for all offerors to
observe.4' This procedure enables cartel participants to determine whether their co-conspirators
abided by the terms of their agreement to rotate
bids or otherwise suppress rivalry. An obvious
reform would be to permit inspection of bids by
a guardian internal to the purchasing organization, such as an inspector general. This simple
measure would complicate the detection of cheating by cartel members and still ensure that the
winning offeror has been identified correctly.42
Amid considerable current interest in reinventing public institutions, a broad-based effort to
identify public policies that reinforce collusion
would be appropriate. The public procurement
mechanism is a single important illustration. A
fuller assessment of the causes of episodes of
collusion prosecuted by the DOJ and the FTC is
Volume 9, number 2

likely to reveal other respects in which public
policies facilitate collusion by discouraging destabilizing entry and increasing the likelihood
that deviations from cartel arrangements will be
detected and punished. It would not be surprising if one found that the federal antitrust agencies often are in the position of attempting to
correct behavior that stems from perverse incentives supplied by flawed public policies.
IV.

The role of the Federal Trade Commission

Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits "unfair
methods of competition"'4 and has been interpreted to prohibit conduct that violates Section
1 of the Sherman Act. Courts also have concluded that the FTC can use Section 5 to challenge conduct that infringes the "spirit or policy"
of the Sherman Act or constitutes an incipient
violation of the Sherman Act' While the existence of a "contract, combination ... or conspiracy" 45 in restraint of trade must be established
to prove a Section 1 violation, no such proof is
necessary to establish a Section 5 violation. For
this reason, Section 5 has been a continuing
source of attraction to the FTC and commentators as a means of attacking facilitating practices
and forms of interfirm coordination that may defy
characterization as an agreement for Sherman Act
purposes.
Over the years, the Commission has used several approaches to apply Section 5 against facilitating practices. Many of the Commission's
earlier cases (where the FTC enjoyed the greatest success) used Section 5 to attack agreements,
either express or tacit, by competitors to implement and use facilitating practices. For example,
most of the Commission's challenges to
industrywide use of basing point pricing systems
and similarly delivered pricing methods have
1997

invoked such theories. 46 In these cases, the conduct arguably was equally susceptible to legal
challenge under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
and reliance on Section 5 was not critical to successful prosecution of the complaint.
In some agreement cases, the FTC has combined conspiracy counts with a separate allegation that the practice violates Section 5 even if
undertaken as a unilateral act, with no agreement
or conspiracy. Although a number of cases find
a violation on such a theory, they rely significantly on the finding of an agreement. 47 The
Commission and judicial opinions in these cases
are generally unsatisfying. Beyond offering
broad generalizations about the FTC's expansive
authority under Section 5, the opinions imprecisely delineate either the liability standard being applied or the type and amount of evidence
needed to establish a violation.
Finally, there are a handful of cases in which
the Commission has challenged a practice that
allegedly fixes prices or reduces competition
without attempting to show any agreement.
While these cases offer the greatest potential for
carving out a unique role for Section 5 in the
facilitating practices area, they pose the greatest
analytical challenges, and the Commission's efforts thus far have yielded unimpressive results.
To date, the only success the Commission can
claim in this area is a somewhat grudging acknowledgment from reviewing courts that such
a violation may be theoretically possible. Courts
uniformly have declined to find liability on the
evidence advanced by the Commission. 4
Despite limited success in this area, the FTC
remains perhaps the best vehicle for articulating
standards designed to discourage anticompetitive
coordination among competitors. Rather than
rely exclusively or even chiefly on litigation to
provide guidance, the Commission might deFeatureArticle* 107

ticle has suggested several approaches for improving the treatment of collusion issues in the
next century. The first is to apply a more meaningful and economically rigorous approach to
evaluating plus factors that are used to determine
when defendants have engaged in something
more than consciously parallel activity and can
properly be deemed to have acted in concert. A
second approach is to experiment with new techniques for generating a larger volume of "direct"
evidence of illegal agreements, including the use
of bounties as incentives for the revelation of
information by insiders to collusive schemes. A
Conclusion
third approach is to alter government policies Collusion is a vital concern of competition such as various features of public procurement
policy, yet the antitrust system has achieved only policy - that facilitate effective collusion. A
modest success in devising a satisfactory defini- fourth approach is for the FTC to assume a larger
tion for the concept of concerted action and cre- role, through hearings, guidelines, and
ating a suitable methodology for establishing the rulemaking, in delineating conduct standards.
existence of an agreement in litigation. This arvelop enforcement guidelines or use rulemaking
to delineate standards of conduct.4 9 The basis
for the use of such tools might be the type of
comprehensive hearings that the Commission
used in 1995 to lay the foundation for new approaches to dealing with issues associated with
the emergence of global markets and innovation
in antitrust analysis. 50 A comparable exploration
of collusion would be appropriate as a foundation for reformulating policies controlling agreements among competitors.
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